home office v dorset yacht case summary

Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co [1970] AC 1004

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A duty of care be owed by the defendant to the claimant in relation to intentional acts by a third party in certain circumstances – the various judgments differed on the factors taken into account (see commentary)
Borstal trainees working at a harbour were left unsupervised by their borstal officers in breach of their instructions
Trainees escaped and damaged C’s yacht
C sued the Home Office, which employed the borstal officers

Held (House of Lords)

C’s claim succeeded
A duty of care was owed to C by the borstal officers and that duty was breached

Lord Diplock

For there to be a duty of care for the acts of the borstal trainees, there must be some special relationship between the custodian and the person to whom the duty is owed, which distinguishes the particular risk owed to the general risk from criminal acts shared by the public
The borstal officers have a duty to recapture the escaped trainees
There is added risk of stealing and property damage in the vicinity of place of detention caused by the escaping trainee

Lord Morris

It was foreseeable that the boys would interfere with one of the yachts, the risk was obvious, hence there is a duty of care owed by officers to the yachts

Lord Pearson

There was geographical proximity and it was foreseeable that the damage was likely to occur, however, something more is needed
The liability for actions of third party can arise where a person is under a duty to control another due to special relations , such as between parent and child
In this case, control of the borstal boys imports responsibility

On remoteness

For a cause not be too remote the act of a third party must be both reasonably foreseeable and very likely
It did not matter if the act of the third party was tortious or not
In finding a duty of care, Lords Diplock and Morris focused on the proximity of the relationship between the borstal officers and the victims due to the particular risk caused by the borstal trainees in their care while Lord Pearson focused on the relationship of control of the borstal officers over the borstal trainees
This case is an exception to the general rule that there is no duty of care for omissions
Lord Reid’s remoteness test was rejected in Lamb v Camden – likelihood is irrelevant to remoteness

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Case Summary: Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co [1970] A.C. 1004

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Legal Principles and Key Points

In the case of Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co [1970] A.C. 1004, it was held that a government body owes a duty to take reasonable care in all the circumstances to prevent third parties under their control from causing damage to private poverty. Failure to do so will bring an action for negligence.

Facts of the Case

7 Borstal boys were working on an island under the control and supervision of three officers of D.
5 of them had known criminal records including convictions for breaking and entering, larceny, and taking away vehicles without the owner’s consent.
After the officers had retired, the boys left the island one night and boarded, cast adrift and damaged C’s yacht, which was moored offshore.
P brought an action for damages against the officers, arguing that they had failed to exercise effective control or supervision over the boys.
D denied that they or their servants or agents owed C any duty of care with respect to the detention of the boys or to the manner in which they were treated, employed, disciplined, controlled or supervised.
It was admitted that D would be vicariously liable if an action would lie against any of the officers.
Did D owe a duty to take reasonable care to avoid the Borstal boys causing damage to any property nearby?

Held by the House of Lords

Finding for C, that D had a common law duty to take all reasonable care to prevent the escape of those in their custody. As such, D is liable for damage to property inflicted by the escapees. Public policy did not require an immunity from such action.
The facts we must assume are that this party of trainees were in the lawful custody of the governor of the Portland Borstal institution and were sent to Brownsea Island in the custody and control of the three officers with instructions to keep them in custody and control. In breach of their instructions these officers simply went to bed leaving the trainees to their own devices. If they had obeyed instructions, they would have prevented these trainees from escaping.
There is a general principle that no person can be responsible for the acts of another who is not his servant or acting on his behalf. But the ground of liability is not responsibility for the acts of the trainees; it is liability for damage caused by the officers’ carelessness and the knowledge that their carelessness would probably result in the trainees causing damage of this kind. So the question is really one of remoteness of damage.
“Then there may, and almost certainly will, be errors of judgment in exercising such a discretion and Parliament cannot have intended the public should be entitled to sue in respect of such errors. But there must come a stage when the discretion is exercised so carelessly or unreasonably that there has been no real exercise of the discretion which Parliament has conferred. The person purporting to exercise his discretion has acted in abuse or excess of his power. Parliament cannot be supposed to have granted immunity to persons who do that. The present case does not raise this issue because no discretion was given to these Borstal officers. They were given orders which they negligently failed to carry out [1031A]”.

Viscount Dilhorne

“In Smith v. Leurs, 70 C.L.R. 256 the parents of a boy of 13 were sued for negligence, it being alleged that they had failed to exercise *1046 reasonable care over the use of a catapult by the boy. It is to be observed that Dixon J. [in that case] did not suggest that there was any special relationship between a person in custody and his custodian which constituted an exception to the general rule enunciated by him” [1045H].

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Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd Case Summary

Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd is a landmark case in the law of negligence, concerning the liability of a public authority for damages caused by the negligent acts of its employees. The case established the principle that a public authority can be held liable for the negligence of its employees if the employee’s duties are sufficiently closely connected to the duties of the authority.

Case Background

In 1971, the Dorset Yacht Company owned and operated a yacht moored in Portland Harbour. The yacht was damaged by a large wave caused by a passing police launch. The wave was caused by the negligent steering of the launch by a police officer, who was an employee of the Home Office.

The Dorset Yacht Company brought a claim for damages against the Home Office, alleging that it was vicariously liable for the actions of its employee. The Home Office argued that it was not liable, as the police officer’s actions were not sufficiently closely connected to his duties to hold the Home Office responsible.

The law of vicarious liability holds that an employer can be held liable for the wrongful acts of its employees if the employee was acting in the course of their employment. To establish vicarious liability, the claimant must show that the employee’s wrongful act was sufficiently closely connected to their duties to hold the employer responsible.

The Case Decision of Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd

The case was initially heard in the High Court, where the judge held that the Home Office was not vicariously liable for the actions of the police officer. The judge found that the officer’s actions were not sufficiently closely connected to his duties to hold the Home Office responsible.

However, the decision was overturned on appeal to the Court of Appeal. The court held that the officer’s duties included the proper navigation of the police launch, and that his negligent steering was a breach of those duties. The court also held that the Home Office was sufficiently closely connected to the officer’s duties to hold it vicariously liable for his actions.

The Home Office appealed the decision to the House of Lords (now the Supreme Court). The House of Lords affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal, holding that the Home Office was vicariously liable for the actions of the police officer.

The House of Lords held that the test for vicarious liability was whether the employee’s wrongful act was sufficiently closely connected to his duties to make it just to hold the employer responsible. The court stated that the question was not whether the employer authorized the employee’s actions or whether the actions were for the benefit of the employer, but whether the actions were so closely connected to the employee’s duties that they could be regarded as being within the scope of his employment.

The court held that the police officer was acting in the course of his employment when he negligently steered the police launch, and that his duties included the proper navigation of the launch. The court also held that the Home Office was sufficiently closely connected to the officer’s duties to hold it vicariously liable for his actions.

Significance of the Case

Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd is significant because it established the principle that a public authority can be held vicariously liable for the actions of its employees if the employee’s duties are sufficiently closely connected to the duties of the authority. This principle has been applied in a number of other cases involving public authorities, including cases involving the police, the NHS, and local authorities.

The case also highlighted the importance of ensuring that public authorities take reasonable care in the selection, training, and supervision of their employees. It emphasized the need for public authorities to ensure that their employees are competent and capable of carrying out their duties safely and responsibly.

Finally, the case serves as a reminder of the importance of the duty of care owed by all employers to their employees and to the public. The duty of care requires employers to take

Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd

Seven boys who had been sentenced to Borstal training were on an island in Poole Harbour.
The boys were in the custody and control of three officers.
The officers did not take any effective steps to prevent the boys from escaping the island.
The boys escaped and caused damage to nearby yachts.
The owners of the yachts sued the Home Office, alleging a duty of care was owed to them by the officers and that the Home Office was vicariously liable for the damage caused by the boys.

Whether a duty of care existed under common law for the officers to prevent the boys from escaping and causing damage to nearby property, and if so, whether the Home Office was vicariously liable for the officers' negligence.

The court found that a duty of care existed under common law for the officers to prevent the boys from escaping and causing damage to nearby property, and that the Home Office was vicariously liable for the officers' negligence.

The court held that the officers owed a duty of care to the owners of the nearby yachts as "neighbors" to prevent damage caused by the boys.
The court found that the officers' failure to take effective steps to prevent the boys from escaping was a breach of their duty of care.
The court held that the Home Office was vicariously liable for the officers' negligence, as the officers were acting within the scope of their employment.
The court rejected the argument that there was no duty of care owed under common law, as the officers were under the control of the Home Office and control imports responsibility.

Disposition:

The court dismissed the appeal on the preliminary issue of law and allowed the case to go to trial on the issues of fact.

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[1970] AC 1004 House of Lords

in

Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co [1970] AC 1004; [1970] 2 WLR 1140; [1970] 2 All ER 294

Negligence centers on the failure to exercise reasonable care, with an element being the duty of care owed to others. In the context of a Borstal institution, the duty extends to the welfare of residents.

Liability questions arise when absconders cause damage to a private yacht, involving scrutiny of the Home Office's fulfillment of its duty of care in managing the Borstal system.

Public policy considerations may influence arguments for or against immunity from legal action.

The discretionary powers in running a Borstal system necessitate a balance between decision-making flexibility and adherence to legal standards, shaping the assessment of the Home Office's role and potential liability.

In a case involving seven Borstal boys working on an island supervised by three officers, Dorset C Yacht Co. Ltd (“Plaintiffs”) filed an action for damages against the Home Office, claiming negligence.

The boys, with known criminal records and previous escapes from Borstal institutions, left the island at night, boarded, cast adrift, and damaged the Plaintiffs' yacht moored offshore.

The Plaintiffs argued that the officers failed to effectively control or supervise the boys despite knowledge of their history.

The Home Office, in response, denied owing any duty of care to the Plaintiffs regarding the detention or treatment of the boys.

The preliminary issue at trial focused on whether the Home Office had a duty of care based on the facts pleaded in the statement of claim.

Thesiger J. affirmed the existence of a duty of care in favor of the Plaintiffs.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, dismissing an appeal by the Home Office.

On a subsequent appeal by the Home Office, the contention included the scarcity of authority for imposing such a duty, the principle that a person cannot be liable for wrongs committed by another of full age and capacity not acting as their servant, and the argument that public policy or relevant legislation mandated immunity for officers.

The appeal was dismissed, with Viscount Dilhorne in dissent.

It was held that the Borstal officers did owe the Plaintiffs a duty to exercise reasonable care in all circumstances to prevent the boys under their control from causing damage to the Plaintiffs' property, especially if there was a manifest risk associated with neglecting that duty.

The judgment further concluded that public policy did not mandate immunity from an action like the one brought by the Plaintiffs.

The affirmative answer to the legal question was deemed correct.

In a legal scenario involving negligence, duty of care, and liability, particularly within the context of a Borstal institution, the analysis emphasizes the importance of understanding the duty of care owed by the Home Office in managing the Borstal system, with a specific focus on a case where seven Borstal boys caused damage to a private yacht.

This legal scenario involves negligence, duty of care, and liability within a Borstal institution context.

It focuses on a case where seven Borstal boys caused damage to a private yacht, leading to the Plaintiffs filing a negligence claim against the Home Office.

The Home Office's denial of duty of care and subsequent legal proceedings, including appeals, are highlighted.

The final judgment dismisses the Home Office's appeal, affirming the duty of care owed to the Plaintiffs and rejecting the argument for immunity based on public policy.

ORIGINAL ANALYSIS

3 Borstal boys were left unsupervised and damaged a boat.

The owner sued the home office for negligence.

HL held that the Borstal officers, for whom the Home Office (HO) was vicariously liable, owed a duty to take such care as was reasonable in the circumstances to prevent the boys damaging property, provided there was a manifest risk of that occurring if they did not take such care.

Since the risk was manifest (they knew of the boys’ criminal records, etc.), HO was liable.

Public policy was also in favour of making HO liable.

Lord Pearson

There was a duty of care to the boat owners under the definition of “neighbourhood” by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson .

NB Pearson says that this is not a universal test but is a general test, to be applied except where it would produce injustice: the test is to be applied unless there is a reason for not applying it. He dismisses each claimed reason for not applying the test.

There IS sufficient proximity here because there isn’t only physical proximity but the harm was also foreseeable.

HO WAS responsible for the boys due to the special relationship between them, despite the boys being legal adults.

Although Borstal training sometimes requires giving boys greater freedom, this may only diminish but not eradicate the duty and it is therefore not against public policy interests to make HO liable for Borstal boys’ actions.

He takes a different approach to Pearson.

He says that where there is a NAI between R’s carelessness and the ultimate damage, it is still possible to sue R provided that the damage was highly probable, and NOT mere foreseeability, as in cases where the damage is direct

(the “very probable” requirement emphasises that the NAI is a consequence of R’s carelessness. “Mere foreseeability” could allow R to be liable even where the damage comes from a new, separate cause , with little connection to the original carelessness).

Lord Diplock

Lord Atkin’s dictum, as he himself said, was not to be applied universally but merely “generally” (i.e. not always) since this would unduly restrict the law.

If it can be established:

That the officers were acting in breach of their instructions (and not acting in pursuance of discretion granted to them, in which case they, and thus the HO would not be liable) and

That in breaching the instructions the harm was reasonably foreseeable, a duty of care to the boat owners existed.

He says the key point is that the criminal has been negligently allowed to escape.

Therefore the police would NOT be liable if the criminal escaped and committed crimes out of habit, as opposed to crimes used to facilitate the escape itself.

Nor would police be liable if they released a prisoner who then committed crimes.

Foreseeability, vicarious liability, proximity and public policy are all considered in deciding whether the duty existed.

RELATED CASES

Lamb v Camden LBC

Donoghue v Stevenson

Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire

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Essential Cases: Tort Law (6th edn)

Alphabetical contents
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562

Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd [1970] AC 1004

Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605
McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59
Khan v Meadows [2021] UKSC 21
Poole Borough Council v GN [2019] UKSC 25
Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2
Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [2018] UKSC 4
Page v Smith [1996] 1 AC 155
McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410
Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310
Frost (or White) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 AC 455
Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co. Ltd [2008] 1 AC 281
Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin and Co. (Contractors) Ltd [1973] 1 QB 27
Murphy v Brentwood DC [1991] 1 AC 398
Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465
Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831
White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207
Steel v NRAM Ltd [2018] 1 WLR 1190
Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850
Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691
Dunnage v Randall [2016] QB 639
Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582
Bolitho v City and Hackney HA [1998] AC 232
Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11
Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613
Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428
Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] 1 AC 1074
Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2003] 1 AC 32
Barker v Corus UK Ltd [2006] 2 AC 572
Gregg v Scott [2005] 2 AC 176
Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Docks & Engineering Co. Ltd (The Wagon Mound No 1) [1961] AC 388
Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360
Henderson v Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation [2020] UKSC 43
Tomlinson v Congleton BC [2004] 1 AC 46
Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172
Tuberville v Savage (1669) 1 Mod Rep 3, 86 ER 684
Murray v Ministry of Defence [1988] 1 WLR 692
Iqbal v Prison Officers Association [2010] QB 732
Wilkinson v Downton [1897] QB 57
St Helen’s Smelting Co. v Tipping [1865] 11 ER 642
Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] AC 655
Coventry v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13
Fearn v Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery [2023] UKSC 4
Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330
Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 2 AC 1
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Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215
R (Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] 1 AC 245
Craig Purshouse Craig Purshouse Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Liverpool
https://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780191995736.003.0002
Published in print: 01 September 2023
Published online: August 2023

Essential Cases: Tort Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd [1970] AC 1004. The document also included supporting commentary from author Craig Purshouse.

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May the law be with you – lex vobiscum

Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office: HL 6 May 1970

A yacht was damaged by boys who had escaped from the supervision of prison officers in a nearby Borstal institution. The boat owners sued the Home Office alleging negligence by the prison officers. Held: Any duty of a borstal officer to use reasonable care to prevent a borstal trainee from escaping from his custody, was owed only to persons whom he could reasonably foresee had property situated in the vicinity of the place of detention of the detainee, and which the detainee was likely to steal or to appropriate and damage in the course of eluding immediate pursuit and capture. Where human action forms one of the links between the original wrongdoing of the defendant and the plaintiff’s loss that action must ‘at least have been something very likely to happen if it is not to be regarded as novus actus interveniens breaking the chain of causation.’ Lord Reid said: ‘there must come a stage when the discretion is exercised so carelessly or unreasonably that there has been no real exercise of the discretion which Parliament has conferred. The person purporting to exercise his discretion has acted in abuse or excess of his power. Parliament cannot be supposed to have granted immunity to persons who do that.’ Lord Diplock described the process by which a legal principle was to be derived from authority, describing it as inductive, testing the characteristics of the cases: ‘This analysis leads to a proposition which can be stated in the form: ‘In all the decisions that have been analysed a duty of care has been held to exist wherever the conduct and the relationship possessed each of the characteristics A, B, C, D, etc, and has not so far been found to exist when any of these characteristics were absent.’ For the second stage, which is deductive and analytical, that proposition is converted to: ‘In all cases where the conduct and relationship possess each of the characteristics A, B, C, D, etc, a duty of care arises.’ The conduct and relationship involved in the case for decision is then analysed to ascertain whether they possess each of these characteristics. If they do the conclusion follows that a duty of care does arise in the case for decision’

Reid, Morris of Borth-y-Guest, Pearson, Diplock, LL, Viscount Dilhorne

[1970] AC 1004, [1970] 2 WLR 1140, [1970] 2 All ER 94, [1970] UKHL 2

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Appeal from – Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office CA 1969 . . Cited – Donoghue (or M’Alister) v Stevenson HL 26-May-1932 Decomposed Snail in Ginger Beer Bottle – Liability The appellant drank from a bottle of ginger beer manufactured by the defendant. She suffered injury when she found a half decomposed snail in the liquid. The glass was opaque and the snail could not be seen. The drink had been bought for her by a . . Cited – Geddis v Proprietors of Bann Reservoir HL 18-Feb-1878 The owner of land injured by operations authorised by statute ‘suffers a private loss for the public benefit’, and in the absence of clear statutory authority is unable to claim: ‘It is now thoroughly well established that no action will lie for . .

Cited – Anns and Others v Merton London Borough Council HL 12-May-1977 The plaintiff bought her apartment, but discovered later that the foundations were defective. The local authority had supervised the compliance with Building Regulations whilst it was being built, but had failed to spot the fault. The authority . . Cited – K v the Secretary of State for the Home Department CA 31-May-2002 The applicant sought damages from the defendant who had released from custody pending deportation a man convicted of violent sexual crimes and who had then raped her. She appealed against a strike out of her claim. She had been refused information . . Cited – Mutual Life And Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd And Another v Evatt PC 16-Nov-1971 The plaintiff had been an investor with the defendant. He asked them about an associated company. He was given advice which was incorrect. He claimed damages for negligence. Held: The company was not itself in the business of giving such . . Cited – British Railways Board v Herrington HL 16-Feb-1972 Land-owner’s Possible Duty to Trespassers The plaintiff, a child had gone through a fence onto the railway line, and been badly injured. The Board knew of the broken fence, but argued that they owed no duty to a trespasser. Held: Whilst a land-owner owes no general duty of care to a . . Cited – Osman v The United Kingdom ECHR 28-Oct-1998 Police’s Complete Immunity was Too Wide (Grand Chamber) A male teacher developed an obsession with a male pupil. He changed his name by deed poll to the pupil’s surname. He was required to teach at another school. The pupil’s family’s property was subjected to numerous acts of vandalism, . . Cited – Chagos Islanders v The Attorney General, Her Majesty’s British Indian Ocean Territory Commissioner QBD 9-Oct-2003 The Chagos Islands had been a British dependent territory since 1814. The British government repatriated the islanders in the 1960s, and the Ilois now sought damages for their wrongful displacement, misfeasance, deceit, negligence and to establish a . . Cited – Dutton v Bognor Regis Urban District Council CA 1972 The court considered the liability in negligence of a Council whose inspector had approved a building which later proved defective. Held: The Council had control of the work and with such control came a responsibility to take care in . . Cited – Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire HL 28-Apr-1987 No General ty of Care Owed by Police The mother of a victim of the Yorkshire Ripper claimed in negligence against the police alleging that they had failed to satisfy their duty to exercise all reasonable care and skill to apprehend the perpetrator of the murders and to protect members . . Cited – Mullaney v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police CA 15-May-2001 The claimant police officer was severely injured making an arrest. He claimed damages from the respondent for contributory negligence of other officers in failing to come to his assistance. Held: If a police officer owes a duty of care to . . Applied – Tate and Lyle Industries Ltd v Greater London Council HL 24-Mar-1983 The plaintiff had constructed and used two jetties, and dredged a channel down to the Thames for their use. The Council constructed two terminals nearby, the result of which was to cause a build up of silt blocking the channel. Held: The . . Applied – Peabody Donation Fund v Sir Lindsay Parkinson and Co Ltd HL 18-Oct-1983 Architects proposed a system of flexible drains for a site, but the contractors persuaded them to accept rigid drains which once laid proved inadequate at considerable cost. The local authority had permitted the departure from the plans. Held: . . Cited – Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Limited (Chief Constable, Fife Constabulary, third party); Maloco v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd HL 1987 The defendant acquired a semi derelict cinema with a view to later development of the site. A fire started by others spread to the pursuer’s adjoining property. Held: The defendants were not liable in negligence. The intervention of a third . . Cited – The Attorney General v Hartwell PC 23-Feb-2004 PC (The British Virgin Islands) A police officer had taken the police revolver, and used it to shoot the claimant. It was alleged that the respondent police force were vicariously liable for his acts and also . . Cited – Binod Sutradhar v Natural Environment Research Council CA 20-Feb-2004 The defendant council had carried out research into a water supply in India in the 1980s. The claimant drank the water, and claimed damages for having consumed arsenic in it. Held: There is a close link between the tests in law for proximity . . Cited – Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council HL 1-Apr-2004 Statutory Duty Not Extended by Common Law The claimant sought damages after a road accident. The driver came over the crest of a hill and hit a bus. The road was not marked with any warning as to the need to slow down. Held: The claim failed. The duty could not be extended to include . . Cited – Regina v Lam and Others (T/a ‘Namesakes of Torbay’) and Borough of Torbay CA 30-Jul-1997 The claimant sought damages after the planning authority allowed the first defendant to conduct a manufacturing business in the course of which spraying activities took place which caused them personal injuries and loss of business. Held: The . . Cited – Hertfordshire Police v Van Colle; Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police HL 30-Jul-2008 Police Obligations to Witnesses is Limited A prosecution witness was murdered by the accused shortly before his trial. The parents of the deceased alleged that the failure of the police to protect their son was a breach of article 2. Held: The House was asked ‘If the police are alerted . . Cited – Mitchell and Another v Glasgow City Council HL 18-Feb-2009 (Scotland) The pursuers were the widow and daughter of a tenant of the respondent who had been violently killed by his neighbour. They said that the respondent, knowing of the neighbour’s violent behaviours had a duty of care to the deceased and . . Cited – Glaister and Others v Appelby-In-Westmorland Town Council CA 9-Dec-2009 The claimant was injured when at a horse fair. A loose horse kicked him causing injury. They claimed in negligence against the council for licensing the fair without ensuring that public liability insurance. The Council now appealed agaiinst a . . Cited – Prudential Plc and Another, Regina (on The Application of) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax and Another SC 23-Jan-2013 The appellants resisted disclosure to the revenue of advice it had received. It claimed legal advice privilege (LAP), though the advice was from its accountants. Held: (Lords Sumption and Clarke dissenting) LAP applies to all communications . . Cited – Woodland v Essex County Council SC 23-Oct-2013 The claimant had been seriously injured in an accident during a swimming lesson. She sought to claim against the local authority, and now appealed against a finding that it was not responsible, having contracted out the provision of swimming . . Cited – Michael and Others v The Chief Constable of South Wales Police and Another SC 28-Jan-2015 The claimants asserted negligence in the defendant in failing to provide an adequate response to an emergency call, leading, they said to the death of their daughter at the hands of her violent partner. They claimed also under the 1998 Act. The . . Cited – Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police SC 8-Feb-2018 Limits to Police Exemption from Liability The claimant, an elderly lady was bowled over and injured when police were chasing a suspect through the streets. As they arrested him they fell over on top of her. She appealed against refusal of her claim in negligence. Held: Her appeal . . Cited – Vedanta Resources Plc and Another v Lungowe and Others SC 10-Apr-2019 The claimants alleged negligence causing them personal injury and other losses arising from pollution from mining operations of the defendants in Zambia. The company denied jurisdiction. In the Court of Appeal the defendants’ appeals were dismissed. . . Cited – Poole Borough Council v GN and Another SC 6-Jun-2019 This appeal is concerned with the liability of a local authority for what is alleged to have been a negligent failure to exercise its social services functions so as to protect children from harm caused by third parties. The principal question of . . Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Negligence, Prisons

Leading case.

Updated: 11 February 2022; Ref: scu.179786

Apps & Integrations

Dorset Yacht Company Ltd v Home Office

Jurisdiction	England & Wales
Judge	THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS,LORD JUSTICE EDMUND DAVIES
Judgment Date	10 March 1969
Judgment citation (vLex)	[1969] EWCA Civ J0310-2
Date	10 March 1969
Court	Court of Appeal (Civil Division)

Damages and Restitution
Crime and Sentencing
Nature of Offence
Practice and Procedure
Court Structure
Administrative and Constitutional Law

[1969] EWCA Civ J0310-2

The Master of The Rolls (Lord Denning),

Lord Justice Edmund Davies and

Lore Justice Phillimore

In The Supreme Court of Judicature

Court of Appeal

Appeal of defendant from judgment of Mr. Justice Thesiger on 19th December, 1968,

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL (The Rt. Hon. Sir Frederick Elwyn Jones, Q. C) Mr. GORDON SLYNN and Mr. L.J. BLOR-COOPER (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared on behalf of the Appellant Defendant.

Mr. W.A. MACPHERSON and Mr. MICHAEL HARRIS (instructed by Messrs. Ingledew Brown, Bennison & Garrett) appeared on behalf of the Respondent Plaintiff.

In September 1962, the motor yacht Silver Mist" was lying at moorings in Poole Harbour. No one was on her. But in the middle of the night seven Borstal boys got aboard her. They cast her adrift and did much damage. The cost of repairs was £1,303 18. 8d. Fortunately the owners of the yacht had insured her. The insurance company paid the damage. They now seek to recover the amount from the Home Office. They sue, of course, in the name of the owners of the yacht, The Dorset Yacht Company Limited: and the case must be determined Just as if the yacht was not insured. But, In point of fact, it is the insurance company who sock to be recouped for the expense.

Speaking in the name of the owners of the yacht, the insurance Company say that there was no proper supervision of the boys. They were all from the Borstal Institution at Portland. They were seven out of a party of ten boys. They had been taken out by three officers of the Institution to Brownssa Island in Poole Harbour. They were on a training exercise. They were quartered in an empty house. The three officers went to bed. So did the ten boys. But during the night seven of the boys got out and did this damage. As might be expected, being in Borstal, they had criminal convictions for breaking and entering premises, larceny, and taking away vehicles without the owners' consent. Five of them had previously escaped from Borstal but had been recaptured. The owners of the yacht say that in these circumstances the three officers ought to have taken precautions to prevent their escaping: and that they were negligent in not doing so: and the Homo Office, being responsible for these officers, ought to pay for the damage they did.

The case has not yet been tried. It comes before us on this preliminary issue of law: "Whether on the facts pleaded in the Statement of Claim, the Homo Office, their servants or agents owed any duty of care to the Dorset Yacht Company capable of giving rise to a liability in damages with respect to thedetention of persons undergoing sentences of Borstal training, or with respect to the manner in which such persons were treated, employed, disciplined, controlled or supervised whilst undergoing such sentences" .

Although the issue is only stated in regard to Borstal training, it involves the wider question of whether the Homo Office are liable for damage done by prisoners who escape from custody or done by them whilst on parole. Strangely enough there is no authority upon it in any of our law books. Nor is there much light thrown upon it by the Judges of the great countries overseas which follow the common law. At any rate, none of particular value was drawn to our attention. There is only a case in the Ipswich County Court some eighteen years ago when the Prison Commissioners were hold liable for £26 worth of damages done by a Borstal boy ( Greenwell v. Prison Commissioners ) Why is there no authority on it I believe that it is simply because, until recently, no lawyer over thought such an action would lie. Take a simple instance. Suppose a warden carelessly forgot to lock the door of a cell, and in consequence a prisoner escaped and broke into a neighbouring house. A lawyer in former times would have scouted the idea that an action lay. He would reject it on one of two grounds:

First, he would say that the damage was too remote. The chain of causation was snapped by the prisoner's own act. His breaking into the house was a novus actus interveniens, See ( Weld-Blundell v. Stevens 1920 A. C. 986 ) by Lord Sumner.

Second, he would say that the warder owed no duty of care to the house-holder. His duty lay only to the Crown. The lawyer would reinforce this argument by reference to the old action for an "escape" from prison. It was in the days when there was imprisonment for debt. If the sheriff allowed the debtor to escape from prison, the creditor could at common law sue the sheriff for the amount of the debt, see ( Jones v. Pope (1680) 1 Williams Saunders 91 ) and afterwards, by statute for damages sustained by reason of the escape, see ( Macvae v. Clarke (1866) L.R. 1. C.P. 403 ). But the action lay only by the creditor: for it was only to him that the sheriff owed a duty: and not to anyone else.

But those two answers have been rudely shaken by recent developments. First, so far as remoteness is concerned, the wicked act of a criminal no longer snaps the chain of causation. If it could reasonably have been foreseen, it is not regarded as a novus actus interveniens . Thus in ( Stansbie v. Troman 1948 2 K.B. 48 ) a decorator left the house unlocked, with the result that a thief walked in and stole jewellery. The decorator was held liable because damage of that kind could reasonably be foreseen. Likewise it seems to follow that, if a warden has charge of a notorious house-breaker, and carelessly forgets to lock the cell-doer, it can reasonably be foreseen that he will escape and break into neighbouring houses. So the damage is not too remote.

Second, so far as duty is concerned, the duty of care is owed not only to the Crown. It is owed to others as well. There have been cases where a violent prisoner has attacked another prisoner within the prison walls. It has been held that, if the prison authorities have not taken proper care to control or supervise the violent prisoner, so as to prevent him doing damage, they are liable to the one who is injured. In Ellis v. Home Office (1953 2 A.E.R. 149), (1953 2 Q.B. 135) in the hospital wing of Winchester Prison, a warder opened the door of a cubicle, and went off. A violent prisoner oalled Hammill, who was a mental defective, walked out of his cubicle and brutally assaulted Ellis, another prisoner. It was accepted by Mr. Justice Devlin and by this Court that the prison authorities owed a duty of care to Ellis. Mr. Justice Devlin said: "This case turns entirely upon the cardinal fact of whether the prison doctor had any reason to believe that Hammill, a mental defective, was lively to commit violence" . In short, upon foresee ability of damage. Similarly in ( D'Arcy v. Prison Commissioners Times Newspaper, 15th and 16th November, 1965 ),Those oases were accepted by the Attorney-General as being correct. But, if so, I do not see where he can stop. Suppose the violent prisoner had struck, not a fellow prisoner, but a visiting magistrate. Surely the magistrate could recover. And why should it be confined to violence within the prison walls? Suppose a party of prisoners is taken out to work on a farm alongside farm-workers, but they are not properly supervised. A violent prisoner strikes first another prisoner and next a farm worker. If the other prisoner has a cause of action against the prison authorities, surely the farm-worker has also. And why should it stop there? If the violent prisoner makes his way to the nearest village, and breaks in and assaults a householder, or steals his goods, surely the householder too can recover.

These recent developments compel us to examine the whole question. It is, I think, at bottom a matter of public policy which we, as Judges, must resolve. This talk of "duty" or "no duty" is simply a way of limiting the range of liability for negligence. Lord Pearce made that clear in Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. , ( 1964 A. C. 534, 531 ) when he said: "The law of negligence has been deliberately limited in its range by the Court's insistence that there can be no actionable negligence in vacuo without the existence of some duty to the plaintiff. For It would be impracticable to grant relief to everybody who suffers damage through the carelessness of another…… How wide the sphere of the duty of care in negligence is to be laid depends ultimately upon the Court's assessment of the demands of society for protection from the carelessness of others".

What then is the right policy for the Judges to adopt? On whom should the risk of negligence fall? Up till now it has fallen on the Innocent victim. Many, many a time has a prisoner escaped - or been let out on parole - and done damage. But there is never a case in our law books when the prison authorities havebeen liable for it. No householder who has been burgled, no person who has been wounded by a criminal, has ever recovered damages from the prison authorities: such as to find a place in the Reports, The householder has claimed on his insurance company. The injured man can now claim on the Compensation Fund. None has claimed against the prison authorities.

Should we alter all this? I should be reluctant to do so if, by so doing, we should hamper all the good work being done by our prison authorities. "Open" prisons are the order of the day. So is the parole system. The men are allowed their freedom as much as possible. It helps to fit them bettor for their return to society. This is especially the case with Borstal Institutions. The Attorney-General, speaking for the Home Office, said: "We want to train these boys to become good citizens. We put them under no restraint quite deliberately. We trust them. We leave them free to escape. It is the way in which they learn responsibility". The Attorney-General went so far as to ...

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United Kingdom
Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
29 January 1993
Queen's Bench Division
15 April 1996
18 March 1981
2 April 2009
Wiley The Modern Law Review No. 62-6, November 1999
1 November 1999

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Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd

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HOME OFFICE v. DORSET YACHT COMPANY LTD.

[1970] 1 lloyd's rep. 453, house of lords, before lord reid, lord morris of borth-y-gest, viscount dilhorne, lord pearson and lord diplock.

Negligence-Dub of care-Damage to yacht by escaping Borstal trainees-Whether Home Office or Borstal officers owed duty of care to yacht-owners-Scheme setting up Borstal institutions to secure reformation of young offenders-Discretion in supervision of Borstal trainees-Whether public policy requires immunity-Remoteness of damage.

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Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd.

Edit source

Several "borstal boys" (young offenders between fifteen and twenty) were under the supervision of three officers when they were working on an island. The officers went to sleep and left them to their work. Seven of the boys escaped, stole a yacht and crashed it into another yacht that was owned by Dorset Yacht. They also boarded the second yacht and caused further damage. The Home Office appealed Dorset's ability to bring a claim to the House of Lords.

Does the fact that competent adults performed the negligent acts break the chain of causation?
Can you be liable for the tortious actions of another party towards a third party?

Decision [ ]

Appeal dismissed, trial allowed.

Reasons [ ]

It is established that the result would not have occurred if the officers were not negligent and had continued to monitor the boys. There are three claims by the Home Office that must be dealt with:

there is no authority to impose a duty like this;
no person can be liable for the acts of another adult who is not their servant or acting on their behalf; and
public policy requires that the officers should be immune from this duty.

Lord Reid, for the majority, dismisses the first defence saying that times have changed and now liability can be found in cases where the outcome was not foreseeable. All that needs to be established is that the initial act was negligent (per Wagon Mound ), which has been established here. They also reject the second defence stating that this claim is negated if the action of the third party is the type of result that could reasonably be foreseen as a result of the negligent act. In this case, the stealing of the boat and damaging another is exactly the type of outcome that should have been foreseen by the officers. Finally, the third defence fails because there are no obvious public policy issues that prevent the duty from being established.

Lord Diplock concurs but has different reasoning. He says that in general, in new situations where duty is being established the characteristics of that situation must be compared to those present in situations accepted to constitute negligence. When there is a discrepancy one must decide if what the new case is lacking is enough to prevent duty from being established. In this case he decides that the fact that they were on an island made the escape by boat a very foreseeable outcome of the negligence, and therefore it should have been prevented.

Viscount Dilhorne, in the dissent, disagrees with the majority because he thinks that they are enacting new laws, which should be the job of legislators and not the courts.

the situation must be compared to existing situations which constitute negligence to determine certain characteristics;
those circumstances must be analysed to see if they give rise to a duty of care; and
if there is a discrepancy, it must be determined if the discrepancy is sufficient to prevent a duty of care from arising.
Liability is not necessarily negated simply because a third party performed the act that caused damage as a result of the initial negligent act; if this action was a foreseeably outcome of the initial act then the original negligent party will be responsible for the outcome of the third party’s actions.
1 Right Of Passage Over Indian Territory Case (Portugal v India)
2 R v Clarke
3 Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists (Southern) Ltd.

IMAGES

Home Office v Dorset Yacht
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd
Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office
Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd summary
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd 1970

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COMMENTS

Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd. 323 words (1 pages) Case Summary. ... Legal Case Summary. Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004; [1970] 2 WLR 1140; [1970] 2 All ER 294; [1970] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 453; (1970) 114 SJ 375. NEGLIGENCE, DUTY OF CARE, BOSTRAL OFFICERS, DUTY OF CARE TO WHOM, PUBLIC POLICY, IMMUNITY FROM ACTION.
Case Summary: Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co [1970] AC 1004
Legal Principles and Key Points. In the case of Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co [1970] AC 1004, liability was established upon a governmental body for the acts of third parties. The case is one juxtaposing public policy decisions with the notion of a duty of care being owed by public authorities.
Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] UKHL 2, [1970] AC 1004 is a leading case in English tort law.It is a House of Lords decision on negligence and marked the start of a rapid expansion in the scope of negligence in the United Kingdom by widening the circumstances in which a court was likely to find a duty of care.The case also addressed the liability of government bodies, a person's ...
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co [1970] AC 1004
Facts. Borstal trainees working at a harbour were left unsupervised by their borstal officers in breach of their instructions. Trainees escaped and damaged C's yacht. C sued the Home Office, which employed the borstal officers.
Case Summary: Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co [1970] A.C. 1004
In the case of Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co [1970] A.C. 1004, it was held that a government body owes a duty to take reasonable care in all the circumstances to prevent third parties under their control from causing damage to private poverty. Failure to do so will bring an action for negligence.
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd Case Summary
The Case Decision of Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd. The case was initially heard in the High Court, where the judge held that the Home Office was not vicariously liable for the actions of the police officer. The judge found that the officer's actions were not sufficiently closely connected to his duties to hold the Home Office responsible.
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd
The owners of the yachts sued the Home Office, alleging a duty of care was owed to them by the officers and that the Home Office was vicariously liable for the damage caused by the boys. Issue: Whether a duty of care existed under common law for the officers to prevent the boys from escaping and causing damage to nearby property, and if so ...
Home Office v Dorset Yacht
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004 House of Lords. Some young offenders were doing some supervised work on Brown Sea Island under the Borstal regime. One night the Borstal officers retired for the evening leaving the boys unsupervised. Seven of them escaped and stole a boat which collided with a Yacht owned by the claimant.
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co [1970] AC 1004; [1970] 2 WLR 1140;
FACTS. In a case involving seven Borstal boys working on an island supervised by three officers, Dorset C Yacht Co. Ltd ("Plaintiffs") filed an action for damages against the Home Office, claiming negligence. The boys, with known criminal records and previous escapes from Borstal institutions, left the island at night, boarded, cast adrift ...
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd [1970] AC 1004
Abstract. Essential Cases: Tort Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd [1970] AC 1004. The document also included supporting commentary from author Craig Purshouse.
Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office: HL 6 May 1970
Appeal from - Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office CA 1969. . . Cited - Donoghue (or M'Alister) v Stevenson HL 26-May-1932. Decomposed Snail in Ginger Beer Bottle - Liability. The appellant drank from a bottle of ginger beer manufactured by the defendant. She suffered injury when she found a half decomposed snail in the liquid.
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd [1970] AC 1004
Chapter. Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd [1970] AC 1004. September 2019. DOI: 10.1093/he/9780191883736.003.0002. In book: Essential Cases: Tort Law. Authors: Craig Purshouse. Craig Purshouse ...
Dorset Yacht Company Ltd v Home Office
3. The case has not yet been tried. It comes before us on this preliminary issue of law: "Whether on the facts pleaded in the Statement of Claim, the Homo Office, their servants or agents owed any duty of care to the Dorset Yacht Company capable of giving rise to a liability in damages with respect to thedetention of persons undergoing sentences of Borstal training, or with respect to the ...
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd
Trust. 83% of customers are highly satisfied with Practical Law and would recommend to a colleague. Improve Response Time. 81% of customers agree that Practical Law saves them time. Region: View on Westlaw or start a FREE TRIAL today, Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd, International - Cases.
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd [1970] AC 1004
Essential Cases: Tort Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd [1970] AC 1004.
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd summary
For educational use only *1004 Home Office Appellants v Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. Respondents. Positive/Neutral Judicial Consideration. Court House of Lords. Judgment Date 6 May 1970. Report Citation [ 1970] 2 W.L. 1140 [ 1970] A.1004
HOME OFFICE v. DORSET YACHT COMPANY LTD.
HOUSE OF LORDS. Before Lord Reid, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Pearson and Lord Diplock. Negligence-Dub of care-Damage to yacht by escaping Borstal trainees-Whether Home Office or Borstal officers owed duty of care to yacht-owners-Scheme setting up Borstal institutions to secure reformation of young offenders-Discretion ...
Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office
It was admitted that the Home Office would be vicariously liable if an action would lie against any of the officers. The preliminary hearing found for the Dorset Yacht Co. that there was, in law, a duty of care and that the case could go forward for trial on its facts. The Home Office appealed to the House of Lords.
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd
Detailed case brief Torts: Negligence home office dorset yacht co ltd. area of law concerned: third party damage court: house of lords date: 1970 judge: lord ... Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd. Course: The Law of Torts (LAWS212) ... Summary of F acts: 3 Bors tal officer s took sever al tr ainees to Browns ea island, ...
The Duty of Care in Negligence: Recently Expressed Policy ...
approval in Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. v. Home Office 12 and, in con-sidering whether the Home Office owes a duty of care for damage legal doctrine when there are understandable policy considerations at hand:" Dry doctrine of a very poor quality obscures the good sense of the con-clusions," he claims; see " Tort Law Public Law in Disguise " (1959) 38
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd.
The officers went to sleep and left them to their work. Seven of the boys escaped, stole a yacht and crashed it into another yacht that was owned by Dorset Yacht. They also boarded the second yacht and caused further damage. The Home Office appealed Dorset's ability to bring a claim to the House of Lords.

Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co [1970] AC 1004

Held (House of Lords)

Lord Diplock

Lord Morris

Lord Pearson

Case Summary: Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co [1970] A.C. 1004

Legal Principles and Key Points

Facts of the Case

Held by the House of Lords

Viscount Dilhorne

Exclusive Industry Scoop

Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd Case Summary

Case Background

The Case Decision of Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd

Significance of the Case

More on Negligence

Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd

Disposition:

Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co [1970] AC 1004; [1970] 2 WLR 1140; [1970] 2 All ER 294

ORIGINAL ANALYSIS

Lord Pearson

Lord Diplock

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Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd [1970] AC 1004

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Dorset Yacht Company Ltd v Home Office

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Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd

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HOME OFFICE v. DORSET YACHT COMPANY LTD.

Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd.

Decision [ ]

Reasons [ ]

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